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Abstract
Grounded in experience in 2020, both major political parties have reasons to expand use of ranked choice voting (RCV)
in their 2024 presidential primaries. RCV may offer a ‘win‐win’ solution benefiting both the parties and their voters. RCV
would build on both the pre‐1968 American tradition of parties determining a coalitional presidential nominee through
multiple ballots at party conventions and the modern practice of allowing voters to effectively choose their nominees in
primaries. Increasingly used by parties around the world in picking their leaders, RCV may allow voters to crowd‐source
a coalitional nominee. Most published research about RCV focuses on state and local elections. In contrast, this article
analyzes the impact on voters, candidates, and parties from five state Democratic parties using RCV in party‐run presiden‐
tial nomination contests in 2020. First, it uses polls and results to examine how more widespread use of RCV might have
affected the trajectory of contests for the 2016 Republican nomination. Second, it contrasts how more than three million
voters in the 2020 Democratic presidential primaries backed withdrawn candidates with the low rate of such wasted votes
for withdrawn candidates in the states with RCV ballots. Finally, it concludes with an examination of how RCV might best
interact with the parties’ current rules and potential changes to those rules.
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1. Introduction
Many view America’s election of its president as one
of the most important choices that the country makes.
Every four years, there is intense interest in the major
parties’ presidential nomination process rules—both as
written and as theymight be reformed—from themedia,
political activists, and the public.
On the one hand, the current process is creating
surprises for the parties—as evidenced by the strength
of outsider candidates like Donald Trump and Bernie
Sanders—and generating interest in how to ensure any
such candidate earns majority support within the party
before becoming its nominee. On the other, reforms
that seem to symbolize a return to the ‘smoke‐filled
rooms’ of the pre‐1968 nominations—like giving more
power to superdelegates and increasing the odds of
a brokered convention—are unpopular among party
voters. To address the goals of (1) choosing strong
nominees who unite the party and help shape its
future and (2) giving more voters a meaningful vote,
the major parties could consider expanding the use
of a reform that has been used in party and general
election contests: ranked choice voting (RCV) ballots.
Specifically, this article analyzes applications of the most
common form of RCV widely known as instant runoff
voting (IRV), which can be adjusted to fit party rules
and thresholds.
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Addressing the first objective of choosing a strong
nominee, the modern presidential primary process gives
more power to voters than the pre‐1968 process, but it
can still neglect their will and divide parties. Most dra‐
matically, candidates can win the majority of pledged
delegates without winning a majority of primary votes,
especially in early contests that often effectively decide
the nomination.Many scholars have noted that the spirit
of compromise that was forced by majority thresholds in
past nominating conventions has dissipatedwith the end
of brokered conventions (Aldrich, 1980; Busch, 1992).
The winner of a narrow plurality of the vote in a hand‐
ful of states that begin the process each year can gain
momentum that alters the course of a race before most
voters have had a say.
RCV, recommended in Robert’s Rules of Order
(Robert, Honemann, & Balch, 2011, pp. 425–428) and
widely used in governmental and party elections, includ‐
ing by all five national parties in Canada when choos‐
ing their party leaders for prime minister and for most
party leadership elections in the United Kingdom, could
directly address this problem (Oberstaedt, 2020). In an
election with RCV, voters rank their preferred candidate
first and can also rank other candidates in order of prefer‐
ence as backups. Votes count for your first choice unless
that candidate is eliminated,which thenmeans your vote
counts for your next ranked choice among the continu‐
ing candidates.
In ‘winner‐take‐all’ primaries, votes would be redis‐
tributed from the last place candidate round‐by‐round
until a candidate attains a majority. RCV primaries with
proportional allocation and delegate thresholds—as was
the case in five Democratic caucuses and primaries in
2020 that used RCV with thresholds of 15% to earn
delegates—would redistribute voter preferences until
every remaining candidate is above the threshold. At that
point, delegateswould be allocated. In addition to releas‐
ing results used to determine delegate allocation, states
and parties could run the tally down to the final two can‐
didates. Doing so could allow themomentum forwinning
the state to go to a candidate not benefiting from a frac‐
turedmajority vote—recognizing that this would require
a shift inmedia attention from ‘plurality thinking’ (that is,
the candidate with the most delegates in a state ‘wins,’
even if less than a majority) to ‘majority thinking’ (that
is, the goal of a nomination process is to identify the can‐
didate who best unites the party).
The RCV ballot has many potential benefits for repre‐
senting the will of primary voters. Those voting early or
by mail for candidates that dropped out of the race prior
to election day would have their preference heard rather
than their vote wasted. In a more wide‐ranging manner,
parties could be more likely to unite around coalitional
candidates that aremore palatable to a broader group of
its delegates and voters than polarizing candidates that
not only might be weak nominees, but also vehicles for
changing the party’s platform and identity. For purposes
of this article, a coalitional candidate is onewho achieves
the most support within their party by earning both first
choice support and backup support from party conven‐
tion delegates or primary voters who prefer a different
candidate, as measured by later ballots at contested con‐
ventions or backup rankings on RCV ballots.
In this sense, RCVmay help alter voter and candidate
strategies. Voters could express their true preferences
at the ballot box rather than engaging in ‘strategic’ vot‐
ing based on trying to make the most of a single choice.
Candidates would have to work harder to earn voters’
backup preferences, encouraging them to form broader
electoral coalitions within their parties.
RCV could be used in the current presidential pri‐
mary system to ensure that the winners of early states
that help establish the ‘momentum’ that today typically
decides nomination contests are better able to unite
groups of voters in their first and later choices. RCV could
also be used as part of more fundamental changes to the
presidential nominating process, such as a replacement
for caucuses or the mechanism for a growing number of
states voting on a single day after early contests define
the field.
The first part of this article conducts a review of lit‐
erature related to how presidential primaries balance
the interests of different stakeholders and how momen‐
tum affects the process. The second part examines RCV
ballots in presidential primaries from a historical per‐
spective, first by examining the history of brokered con‐
ventions and then by describing how RCV could have
altered the course of the 2016 Republican primary pro‐
cess. The third part of the article discusses RCV in prac‐
tice, including the impact of RCV’s use in five states in the
2020 Democratic nomination contest. The fourth part of
this article looks at RCV in the context of different party
and state rules and potential changes to those rules.
2. Academic Literature on the Dynamics of Presidential
Nomination Contests
2.1. Balancing the Interests of Party Elites and Party
Voters in Presidential Primaries
There is a significant amount of political science litera‐
ture that examines presidential primaries in the United
States. One focus of scholarly research on presidential
primaries is determining the relative influence of party
elites vis‐à‐vis presidential primary voters in deciding the
major party’s presidential nominations. In “One Party
Decided,” Cohen (2018) evaluates The Party Decides
(Cohen, Karol, Noel, & Zaller, 2008) in light of the
2016 Democratic and Republican presidential primaries.
Cohen (2018, p. 256) summarizes the book as a “study of
the ‘invisible primary,’ the process by which party elites
agree upon a nominee before the presidential primaries
have concluded.” Revisiting the “four invisible primary
fundamentals” that can be predictive of presidential
primary performance—“polls, money, media coverage,
and endorsements”—Cohen concludes that Democratic
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party elites effectively decided on Hillary Clinton as the
2016 nominee, while Republican Party elites were too
slow and fractured in making endorsements to prevent
Donald Trump’s nomination (Cohen, 2018, pp. 261, 272).
Steger (2016) adds similar caveats to The Party
Decides, arguing that while party elites may influence
presidential primary outcomes, this role is conditional
and depends on how many elected officials make
endorsements, when they do so, and the extent to which
they coalesce.
Norrander (1996, p. 876) conducts a comprehensive
literature review regarding presidential nomination poli‐
tics and concludes that “rules matter.” Norrander (1996)
finds that numerous studies have demonstrated how var‐
ious primary rules affect both the type of candidates that
succeed and the way they campaign.
Aldrich (1980, p. 10) studies the evolution of the pres‐
idential primary system and finds that reforms in the
1970s, as well as other factors (such as the influence of
massmedia, public opinion polling, and theweakening of
party organization), create a situation where “delegates
to the convention play an ever‐shrinking role in the deci‐
sions about which presidential nominees are chosen.”
Steger (2018) then applies the Herfindahl‐Hirschman
Index to presidential primaries, finding that presidential
primary voters have hadmeaningful choices inmost elec‐
tions since the 1970s reforms were implemented.
While this increase in presidential primary voters’
influencemay have an intuitive appeal that parallels how
most states conduct congressional primaries, scholars
have noted downsides to this ‘democratization’ of the
process. Busch (1992) laments the reforms of the pres‐
idential nominating system, including the decline of the
‘mixed’ nominating system where voters had some say
at select primaries but delegates had the power to deter‐
mine the nominee at the convention. He argues that
political parties could be better served if the process
required movements to build support among party lead‐
ers, helping their nominees win elections and ensuring
that they can consolidate the party over the long term
(Busch, 1992).
The outcomes of presidential primaries can have
long‐lasting consequences on parties’ ideological com‐
position and governance, so while some partisans may
be entirely focused on ‘electability,’ many party elites
and primary voters also have an interest in choosing an
ideologically representative nominee. As Steger (2018,
p. 278) notes, “presidential nominations are consequen‐
tial because the presidential nominee of a party plays
an outsized role in shaping public perceptions of what
a party stands for and setting expectations about what
it will do if it wins the election.” Scala (2018) makes the
case for the importance of ideology in voter decision
making during primaries, arguing that even thoughmany
voters do not have definitive self‐identified ideologies
nor fully understand candidates’ ideologies, they have a
rough estimation of presidential primary candidate ide‐
ology that is an important cue for the way they vote.
There is still the question of whose ideology and pref‐
erences should be represented: party elites or primary
voters? No matter the stance one takes on this ques‐
tion, RCV is one potential reform to help parties more
efficiently balance elites’ and voters’ influence over the
process. If party elites are fractured in their endorse‐
ments but clearly opposed to one candidate (e.g., Donald
Trump in 2016), RCV ballots can be a way for primary vot‐
ers to reflect party elite preferences and consolidate sup‐
port around a candidate that elites find acceptable.
Crucially, voters still have the choice of whether they
will follow party elites’ signals or not. However, RCV
ballots could help avoid playing a game of ‘plurality
roulette’—both major party’s current nomination rules
risk a ‘hostile takeover’ from a plurality faction, while
RCV ballots can help shift to a more majoritarian nomi‐
nation system.
2.2. The Influence of Momentum in Presidential
Primaries and Caucuses
Another focus of scholarly research is on momentum
and the way that the sequential nature of presiden‐
tial primaries and caucuses plays a dynamic role in the
decisions of candidates and voters. Examples abound of
early contests elevating a candidate out of a crowded
field and becoming the inevitable nominee before most
states vote.
Bartels’ (1988, p. 5) systematic study of momentum
in presidential primaries evaluates “the complex inter‐
actions among initial primary results, expectations, and
subsequent primary results that make it possible for
[presidential primary candidates] to emerge from rela‐
tive obscurity into political prominence in a matter of
days or weeks” and provides a framework for more
recent scholarship.
One way to examine momentum is in shaping vot‐
ers’ perceptions of candidate viability (how likely a can‐
didate is to win the party nomination) and electability
(how likely a candidate is to win the general election).
Abramowitz (1989, p 988) evaluates responses to a 1988
DeKalb County presidential primary exit poll and finds
that, while respondents do not necessarily distinguish
between viability and electability, they act “to a consider‐
able extent… as rational utility maximizers” in weighing
viability and electability over their evaluation of the can‐
didates. Redlawsk, Tolbert, and Donovan (2010) argue
that the sequential nature of presidential nomination
contests, starting with the Iowa caucuses, allows for can‐
didates to gain ‘momentum’ from wins in earlier states
that shape voters’ perception of candidate viability and
electability which ultimately influences the outcome of
later nominating contests.
Redlawsk et al. (2010, p. 10) find evidence of these
dynamics from the 2008 Iowa caucuses, writing that:
Our national survey data show that winning (mostly
white Iowa) was critical to perceptions that Obama
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could win the nomination (what is called ‘viability’),
and that viability was in turn the most important fac‐
tor for predicting a vote for Obama in subsequent pri‐
maries and caucuses.
The central importance ofmomentum in the presidential
primary processmeans that very few votes in early states
that often have crowded fields of candidates can allow
a candidate lacking in broad support across their party
to be propelled towards their nomination. These dynam‐
ics may strengthen the importance of ranked choice bal‐
lots, as RCV could be an important component of early
primaries and caucuses to ensure the winner who gar‐
ners momentum fromwinning such contests reflects the
broad support of the electorate.
3. The Historical Perspective on RCV in Presidential
Primaries
3.1. Historical Context: Pre‐1968 Multiple‐Ballot Party
Conventions Resulting in Coalitional Nominees
In order to understand how presidential primaries have
shifted from being an elite‐driven process to one that
includes a larger role for primary voters, it is useful to
review the history of these nomination rules. For much
of American history, the presidential primary process did
not involve any primaries at all, nor any participation
from rank‐and‐file party members. Until the late 1820s,
congressmen met behind closed doors in what was
known as a ‘King Caucus’ to determine party platforms
and nominees (Roberts, Hammond, & Sulfaro, 2004).
As criticism of the King Caucus system grew louder, con‐
ventions opened up greater access to the presidential
nominating process in the 1830s, but these conventions
were still dominated by party elites who selected dele‐
gates by secretive means (Cowan, 2016).
Voters steadily gained more power at the end of the
twentieth century, when a progressive‐era movement
for ‘small‐d democracy’ pushed states to institute pri‐
mary elections whereby ordinary party members could
cast votes for their preferred candidate (Cowan, 2016).
However, these conventions still empowered delegates
who were typically not bound to vote for the winner
of their primaries, and by 1968, 20 states still had no
open selection process for delegates (McGovern–Fraser
Commission, n.d.).
The foundations for themodern presidential primary
processwere created in thewake of the 1968McGovern–
Fraser Commission’s recommendations for reform of the
Democratic Party rules, after Hubert Humphrey’s con‐
troversial nomination and subsequent loss that perma‐
nently disrupted the New Deal Coalition (Atkeson &
Maestas, 2009). These changes included binding dele‐
gates to the results of their state primaries and encour‐
aging more state legislatures to mandate primaries in
states that previously had non‐public methods for select‐
ing delegates (Atkeson &Maestas, 2009). These reforms,
which eventually found a permanent place in both par‐
ties, were critical to democratizing the presidential pri‐
mary process, but they also ensured that conventions
would be even less likely to require multiple rounds of
balloting as the presumptive nominee could be estab‐
lished well before the convention.
Indeed, no major‐party presidential nominating con‐
vention has required more than one ballot since 1952
(DeSilver, 2016). Prior to that, though, 18 such multiple‐
ballot (or brokered) conventions occurred among the
60 conventions after the end of the Civil War (DeSilver,
2016). At these brokered conventions, party insiders
selected as delegates were often forced to compromise
among themselves over the course of multiple rounds of
voting, providing modern‐day lessons about how parties
can field coalitional nominees. That said, there may be
some instances in which the goal of fielding coalitional
candidates is not shared by all party elites whomay favor
a particular faction or candidate.
3.1.1. Brokered Conventions Can Produce Coalitional
Nominees
Most notably, because the party’s nomineewas required
to win the votes of a majority (or supermajority, as
in the case of the early Democratic Party) of dele‐
gates, brokered conventions often led to the selec‐
tion of coalitional candidates who appealed to broader
ranges of geographic and partisan interests. One exam‐
ple that illustrates this consensus‐building process was
the 1860 Republican Convention in which Abraham
Lincoln triumphed in three ballots after initially fin‐
ishing well‐behind William Seward in the first round
(Ecelbarger, 2008).
The convention showcased Lincoln’s political acumen
and ability to appeal to multiple factions and state dele‐
gations, including those of his political rivals, as Lincoln’s
support grew from one‐fifth of delegates in the first
ballot to three‐fourths in the third (Ecelbarger, 2008).
Lincoln was also able to grow his support on successive
ballots based on the greater appeal of his ideological
stances, as some saw Seward as too closely aligned with
the party’s radical wing (Ecelbarger, 2008). Conversely,
Lincoln’s stances on issues of the economy and slav‐
ery were better aligned with the general electorate,
enabling him to ultimately carry Western states and win
the presidency—a breakthrough for his recently formed
party (Ecelbarger, 2008). These attempts to field a more
electable nominee at contested conventions appear suc‐
cessful, as FairVote’s review of major‐party nominating
conventions since 1844 shows that 57% of come‐from‐
behind winners at contested conventions went on to win
the general election (FairVote, 2020a).
3.1.2. RCV Crowd‐Sources a Coalitional Nominee
RCV may build upon the virtues of brokered conventions
in an era where these conventions have become a thing
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of the past. RCV simulates the use of multiple rounds
of balloting to earn a majority, but these rounds occur
efficiently and instantly rather than producing long and
protracted fights that once occurred at brokered con‐
ventions. In 1924, for example, it took 103 ballots for
Democratic Party delegates to agree on a nominee, with
the convention’s fights overshadowing the nomination
(McVeigh, 2001).
Presidential primaries using RCV may also enable a
public, crowd‐sourcing selection of coalitional nominees
without the undemocratic nature of party elites choos‐
ing on behalf of party voters. In past conventions, can‐
didates could even bypass the primary process entirely,
as Adlai Stevenson and Hubert Humphrey did in 1952
and 1968 respectively, and still win the nomination by
shoring up support with party bosses rather than party
members (Whitney, 2004). A primary process with RCV,
on the other hand, allows voters, rather than only party
elites, to express the full scope of their choices to poten‐
tially determine a consensus among themselves, increas‐
ing the likelihood that the nominee is representative of
their will. In this way, RCV has the power to combine the
democratic elements of the party primary process post‐
1968 with the compromise politics of prior conventions.
3.2. RCV Counterfactual in 2016 GOP Presidential
Nomination
To understand how RCV could affect the modern
presidential primary process, the 2016 Republican pri‐
maries can provide an interesting counterfactual exam‐
ple. On 26 May 2016, Donald Trump clinched the
Republican presidential nomination after a long and divi‐
sive campaign season that started with 17 candidates
(Sides, Tesler, & Vavreck, 2018). Trump polarized the
party and ultimately earned nearly 60% of pledged del‐
egates with just under 45% of the primary vote and
with a favorability rating in his party that at times was
just barely more positive than negative (Berg‐Andersson,
2016; Silver, 2016). Several of his issue preferences broke
with long traditions of the party in areas like foreign pol‐
icy, trade, and immigration.
This result may have been made possible by the
momentumgained fromearlywinswith lowpluralities of
the vote. Trump benefited from Republican nomination
rules which enabled 28 states to hold primaries in 2016
that used the winner‐take‐all system to allocate at least
some delegates from that state or its congressional dis‐
tricts to the plurality winner (Putnam, 2016). Trump did
not earn a majority of the votes cast in any of the first 33
states to vote. Of those 33 states, Trump earned 38% of
the vote but 47% of delegates. By the time Trump began
earning majorities after more than twomonths of plural‐
ity wins, all but three of the candidates had withdrawn
from the race (Berg‐Andersson, 2016).
As a result, Trump did not need to break out of
his proverbial ceiling to rack up delegates and instead
could let his base carry him, winning eight of the last 11
winner‐take‐all primaries (King, 2018). Conversely, RCV
may encourage candidates to appeal to voters other than
their base by incentivizing candidates to compete for first
and later choice votes to attain majority support.
3.2.1. Trump May Have Needed to Gain Support
Outside of His Base with RCV Primaries
A poll of Republican voters conducted by FairVote in
partnership with the College of William and Mary and
YouGov in February 2016 at the time of the Iowa cau‐
cuses mirrored the effect of RCV in the Republican
primary process by asking respondents for not only
their first‐choice candidate but also their later rank‐
ings (FairVote, 2016). The survey included more than
1,000 respondents, with more than 90% choosing to
rank all 11 candidates (FairVote, 2016). FairVote’s poll
found that while Trump led the field with the most first
choice rankings at 37%, he also had the most (22%) last
choice rankings of any candidate (FairVote, 2016). In a
full RCV simulation with these nationally representative
voters, Sen. Ted Cruz attained a narrow majority, beat‐
ing Trump head‐to‐head when later choices were redis‐
tributed (FairVote, 2016).
More than a dozen other national and other polls
provided second choice data and head‐to‐head compar‐
isons that allowed FairVote to simulate RCV primaries.
While Donald Trump consistently was the plurality leader
in these polls, he frequently was not the winner after
a simulated instant runoff (Richie, 2016). While some
believe such polling has misjudged support for Trump in
the past, there is no evidence of any systematic polling
error in polls of the 2016 Republican primary (Kennedy
et al., 2018).
FairVote’s analysis in 2016 showed how the use of
RCV by Republican voters may have resulted in differ‐
ent outcomes in most early primaries. While Trump won
seven of nine regular primaries on Super Tuesday, for
example, cementing his status as the Republican fron‐
trunner, FairVote’s simulation found Trump could have
won as few as two primaries that day if the tally were
run down to two candidates with RCV (Douglas, Richie,
& Louthen, 2016; “Super Tuesday results 2016,” 2016).
Trump also likely would have lost to Sen. Marco Rubio in
the crucial winner‐take‐all South Carolina primary that
created momentum for him going into the March con‐
tests (Douglas et al., 2016). Polls suggest Cruz and Rubio
could have won six of the Super Tuesday states, and
Gov. John Kasich one (Douglas et al., 2016). As an exam‐
ple, Table 1 below shows the results of a RCV simula‐
tion in Georgia that suggests Rubio would have been
favored after earning backup support from supporters
of Cruz and other eliminated candidates. In actuality,
Trump earned amajority of Georgia’s delegates with less
than 39% of the vote.
These findings indicate that Trump would have had
to change his strategy in the 2016 primaries to have
won the nomination under RCV rules. Specifically, Trump
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Table 1. RCV simulation, Georgia Republican primary, 2016.
Candidate First round Second round Third round
Donald Trump 38.8% 42.6% 48.9%
Marco Rubio 24.4% 30.5% 51.0%
Ted Cruz 23.6% 26.8% —
All Other Candidates 13.1% — —
would have had to campaign outside of his base to con‐
solidate support, even among those who did not rank
him first.
While Trump did go on to win the 2016 presidential
election in a narrow Electoral College victory while los‐
ing the popular vote, Cohen (2018) has noted that other
Republican contenders may have been just as success‐
ful given the low favorability ratings of Hillary Clinton
in 2016. Additionally, winning presidential elections may
not be the only focus of a party. A presidential nominee
can have an enduring impact on the party through their
effect on down‐ballot races and its future direction. As a
result, RCVmaybe away for parties to allow for evolution
and change while ensuring a majority of primary voters,
rather than a narrow plurality, drive that change.
4. Presidential Primary Reform in Practice
The effect of RCV in presidential primaries is not just a
thought experiment. Five state Democratic parties used
RCV ballots in presidential primary elections and cau‐
cuses in 2020, including Nevada for early voters and
Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, and Wyoming for all voters (Otis,
2020b). Ultimately, over 280,000 voters used RCV bal‐
lots for presidential primaries and caucuses in 2020
(Ginsburg, 2020b; McDonald, 2020).
All five RCV states were caucus states prior to
2020, and they added RCV to their nominating con‐
tests in response to new rules from the Democratic
National Committee and an ongoing desire to create
a smooth process for participants. Nina Herbert, the
Wyoming Democratic Party communications director,
says: “We began working backwards from, ‘how can we
make it easy for people to vote?’ and built the logistics
around that” (Otis, 2020b). Notably, the DNC Rules and
Bylaws Committee unanimously approved these states’
uses of RCV for that reason (Ginsburg, 2019).
Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, and Wyoming implemented
party‐run primary elections with RCV ballots instead of
caucuses (Otis, 2020b). RCV allowed them to preserve
some elements of caucuses, such as allowing voters to
‘realign’ with a different candidate if their first choice is
not viable, while creating a more modern and accessible
experience for voters—one that was a particularly fortu‐
itous choice after the onset of COVID‐19. Nevada chose
to keep traditional caucuses, but turned to RCV to enable
early voters, which made up 70% of participants, to have
their voices heardwith RCV ballots incorporatedwith the
traditional realignments of in‐person caucus‐goers (Otis,
2020b). Iowa, the nation’s first contest, would have done
a similar approach if the DNC had allowed voting by tele‐
phone (Hunnicutt & Brice, 2019).
4.1. How RCV Reduces ‘Wasted Votes’
The results from these first five states to use RCV in
presidential primaries and caucuses demonstrate the
potential of RCV to engage voters and allocate conven‐
tion delegates in a democratic, fair, and transparentman‐
ner that can make more votes count.
The crowded field of candidates in the 2020
Democratic primary led to ‘wasted votes’ in non‐RCV
states in two ways. First, more than three million votes
were cast for candidates who had withdrawn from the
race prior to Election Day in that state (FairVote, 2020c).
Many of these votes came from early and mail voters,
who cast their ballot days or weeks ahead of primary
day. In Washington, FairVote demonstrated that more
than 33% of the primary votes that were cast early went
to withdrawn candidates—a rate fully five times higher
than the rest of the ballots cast closer to the primary
(Otis, 2020a).
Additionally, votes can be wasted when a voter’s
first choice candidate fails to achieve the 15% thresh‐
old required to earn convention delegates from a given
jurisdiction. Caucus‐goers have the option to realignwith
a viable campaign, but primary voters simply lose the
opportunity to influence delegate allocation. More than
1.4million voters cast ballots for an active candidatewho
did not earn a share of their state’s delegates (FairVote,
2020c). The combined wasted votes from these two
sources representmore than fourmillion votes, as shown
in Table 2 below, or 12% of all Democratic primary voters
in 2020 (FairVote, 2020c).
In the states that used RCV for all voters, no bal‐
lots went to withdrawn candidates or active candidates
below the 15% threshold. In Alaska, for example, the
only two candidates to earn delegates were Joe Biden
and Bernie Sanders. Eleven percent of voters chose a
different candidate as their first choice, but over 99%
of Alaska Democrats ranked at least one of the two
delegate‐earners on their ballots. Even voters whose
vote did not count for their first choice ultimately had a
voice in the delegate allocation between the two finalists
(see Table 3 below).
In an RCV election, the only votes that do not count
towards the outcome are ballots that do not rank any
delegate‐earning candidates and the small number that
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Table 2.Wasted votes, 2020 Democratic primaries and caucuses.
Category Votes Percent of total votes cast
Votes for withdrawn candidates 3,010,892 8.2%
Votes for non‐delegate‐earning candidates 1,448,695 3.9%
Total Democratic primary and caucus votes cast 36,917,179 —
contain a disqualifying error. It is likely that, with RCV, the
vastmajority of ‘wasted votes’ in other stateswould have
counted for delegates.
4.2. Voters’ Use of Ranked Choice Ballots
Voters in RCV states overwhelmingly took advantage of
the option to rank candidates on their ballots, demon‐
strating their understanding of RCV and their willingness
to engagewith a rankedballot. Even though JoeBidenhad
become the presumptive nominee prior to the first fully
ranked‐choice primary election, nearly three out of every
four voters ranked multiple candidates (Otis, 2020b).
Ballot use varied slightly between states based on the
date of the election. However, a vast majority of voters
in each RCV state opted to rank more than one candi‐
date, even when only Joe Biden was actively campaign‐
ing, as was the case for Kansas and Hawaii (Otis, 2020b).
In addition, the ballot error rate was very low, in line with
error rates in other RCV contests. In Nevada, 99.7% of in‐
person early voters used at least three rankings, and an
even higher percentage in the four RCV primary states
cast a valid ballot (Ginsburg, 2020c; Otis, 2020b).
5. RCV and the Broader Primary Reform Landscape
5.1. Integrating RCV with Current Party Rules
The Democratic and Republican parties have signifi‐
cant differences in the way that delegates are allocated
and, thus, the way that RCV would determine dele‐
gate allocation.
5.1.1. Integrating RCV with Democratic Primary Rules
The Democratic Party implemented rules in 1992 to
award delegates proportionally to only the candidates
that clear a threshold of 15% of the vote (Putnam, 2019).
With RCV, all ballots are first counted for the candidate
marked as the first choice. If all candidates have crossed
the vote threshold (15% per Democratic Party rules), the
count is complete and delegates are awarded proportion‐
ally. If the tally for any candidate is below the thresh‐
old, the candidate with the fewest votes is dropped and
that candidate’s ballots are added to the totals of each
voter’s next ranked choice. The process continues until
all remaining candidates have crossed the threshold and
delegates are awarded proportionally among the remain‐
ing candidates. As a result, themillions of voterswho cast
ballots for candidates that do not reach this threshold
could still have their voice heard with RCV as their vote
could be redistributed to their later choices if they used
such rankings.
5.1.2. Integrating RCV with Republican Primary Rules
The Republican Party allows states more leeway for set‐
ting their own delegate allocation rules, which leads to a
patchwork of different systems to award delegates. The
nomination process begins with states that usemore pro‐
portionalmethods (oftenwith thresholds) and later shifts
to states that primarily use winner‐take‐all methods to
allocate all delegates to the winner of the plurality of the
primary vote (Uhrmacher, Schaul, & Mellnik, 2016).
For delegates awarded with a threshold, RCV would
operate in the same manner that it would in Democratic
primary contests. For delegates awarded with winner‐
take‐all methods, an ‘instant runoff’ would occur if no
candidate attains a majority of first choices. Candidates
in last place would have their ballots counted for their
next choices until two candidates are left. In this way,
RCV may allow winner‐take‐all states to award their del‐
egates to the candidate with the deepest and broadest
support among the electorate.
5.2. Voter Confidence in Early and Mail‐In Voting
with RCV
RCV could allow party officials to continue to expand
voter access with early and mail‐in voting without fear
Table 3. RCV results in Alaska by final‐round preference.
Category Votes Percent of total votes cast
Joe Biden as first choice 9,862 49.9%
Bernie Sanders as first choice 7,764 39.3%
Counted for Biden as a later choice 972 4.9%
Counted for Sanders as a later choice 991 5.0%
Did not rank either finalist 170 0.9%
Total ballots cast 19,759 —
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of ‘wasted votes.’ Ballots cast before primary day often
end up as ‘wasted votes’ as presidential candidates may
drop out after a voter cast their ballot for them, as was
the case with more than three million Democratic votes
in 2020 andmore than 600,000 Republican votes in 2016
(FairVote, 2020c; Ginsburg, 2020a). With RCV, on the
other hand, voters’ backup choices could be considered,
giving voters confidence that their voice will be heard
even if they cast a ballot early. RCV has not been adopted
on a wide enough scale to empirically test interactions
with early voting, mail voting, or other reforms.
5.3. RCV as a Strong Alternative to Caucuses
Seven states and most territories did not hold state‐
run primaries in 2020. These states had traditionally
held in‐person caucuses with Democrats usually allow‐
ing participants to ‘vote with their feet’ and ‘re‐align’ to
another candidates’ group if their preferred candidate is
not viable in their precinct.
However, such caucuses are time‐intensive for par‐
ticipants, leading to an electorate that is not repre‐
sentative of the overall party and depressed rates of
turnout that can be only a third as large as primaries
(Unite America Institute, 2020). As a result, many states
are moving away from traditional in‐person caucuses.
Notably, Nevada is already seriously considering convert‐
ing its early caucus into a primary to allowmore voters to
participate, while Iowa’s first‐in‐the‐nation caucus is fac‐
ing increasing scrutiny, especially on the Democratic side,
given concerns with the messiness of reporting results
in 2020 and Iowa’s disproportionately white demograph‐
ics (Appleton, 2021; McCormick, 2021). Both parties are
beginning to think about restructuring their nomination
calendars for 2024with a formal review underway by the
Democratic National Committee (McCormick, 2021).
While the results of this potential restructuring are
far from certain, the rising criticism of caucuses offers an
opportunity for the expansion of RCV ballots. As demon‐
strated in five Democratic contests in 2020, RCV may
allow such state parties to holdmore accessible contests,
including early voting and vote bymail that enable voters
to express their alternative preferences through a sim‐
pler and more efficient process than in‐person caucus‐
ing (Otis, 2020b). Additionally, while an RCV primarymay
not be able to simulate all elements of caucuses, such as
the discussion and lobbying that occurs, it can modern‐
ize the process and help states avoid the caucus‐specific
issues that plagued Iowa and Nevada in 2020 (Culliford
& Reid, 2020).
6. Conclusion
The modern presidential primary process has evolved
over time, and RCV ballots represent a logical next step in
the reform process, with potential benefits for both par‐
ties and voters. Before the McGovern‐Fraser reforms in
1968, the presidential primary process was dominated
by party elites and forced compromise between them
through conventions that required multiple rounds of
balloting. Such brokered conventions often produced
coalitional nominees who had majority support across
party delegates. These coalitional candidates had desir‐
able attributes for the party and its voters as they were
less likely to be polarizing, could unite multiple party fac‐
tions, and were often more electable. This process was
untenable in the modern era, however, as it allowed
party delegates to choose their nominee in proverbial
‘smoke‐filled rooms’ without the say of ordinary voters.
While the democratization of the presidential pri‐
mary process has ensured that all modern party con‐
ventions have required only one ballot, RCV may allow
for the selection of coalitional candidates by voters. This
crowdsourcing of a coalitional nominee occurs through
requiring the winning candidate to have broad appeal to
voters in both first and later choice preferences. In this
sense, RCV may combine the consensus‐building of pre‐
1968 conventions with the modern practice of empow‐
ering voters to choose their party’s nominees.
Recent presidential primaries illustrate the value of
RCV. The 2016 Republican presidential primary process
demonstrated that, without RCV, a candidate can win
many Republican primaries and capture the nomination
with only narrow pluralities. Polling data indicates that
with RCV, conversely, Trump may have had to adjust
his approach or other Republican candidates with wider
appeal could have better competed for second and later
choice votes.
In 2020, more than 280,000 Democratic primary vot‐
ers cast ranked choice ballots in five states, demonstrat‐
ing how RCV may improve the voting process. In these
states, RCV eliminated ‘wasted votes’ for candidates that
dropped out after the voter cast their ballot or did not
clear the delegate threshold. Voters also demonstrated
enthusiasm for RCV, with most voters utilizing multi‐
ple rankings.
While 2020 was a watershed year for RCV in presi‐
dential primaries, 2024 offers the opportunity for its fur‐
ther expansion. FairVote anticipates that most, if not all,
of the five state Democratic parties that implemented
RCV in the 2020 Democratic primaries (Nevada, Alaska,
Wyoming, Kansas, and Hawaii) will continue to use RCV
ballots in 2024 given their 2020 successes. In addition,
Maine will join these states using RCV in presidential pri‐
maries as its 2020 law requires the implementation of
RCVballots in both parties’ primaries beginning in 2024—
although the parties will have to decidewhether tomake
use of the RCV ballot data to be generated by voters
(FairVote, 2020b).
Beyond these states, it is quite possible that other
state parties, recognizing the efficacy of RCV in 2020 pri‐
mary contests, will also implement RCV ballots in some
form for their primaries or caucuses in 2024.
Should RCV be expanded in presidential primaries,
it could both complement existing party rules and work
well with other potential future reforms. As one example,
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Ethics and Public Policy Center fellow Henry Olsen pro‐
posed in the Washington Post a de facto national pri‐
mary two months after several opening contests, with
RCV used in that final vote (Olsen, 2020). Democrats con‐
cerned about their proportional allocation rules leading
to a brokered convention might consider using RCV to
enable raising the delegate threshold after the early con‐
tests without resulting in more wasted votes. In all of
these applications, RCV would positively affect voter and
candidate decision‐making by eliminating the need for
‘strategic’ voting while encouraging candidates to cam‐
paign to broader coalitions.
RCV ballots indeed could successfully be imple‐
mented with all forms of delegate allocation, ensuring
more candidates reach the threshold to attain delegates
or ensuring more representative nominees in states with
winner‐take‐all rules. RCV could also enable greater con‐
fidence in vote‐by‐mail and early voting that otherwise
leads to ‘wasted votes’ for candidates that drop out
before election day. Responding to the need tomake cau‐
cuses accessible, RCV ballots may allow voters to realign
their preferences in a more time‐efficient manner with
higher turnout. While the days of ‘smoke‐filled rooms’
may be in the past, parties that value consensus have a
path available to them in the form of RCV.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank their colleagues at
FairVote and fellow participants at the 2020 Iowa Caucus
Shambaugh Conference for their contributions to this
article.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Abramowitz, A. I. (1989). Viability, electability, and candi‐
date choice in a presidential primary election: A test
of competing models. The Journal of Politics, 51(4),
977–992.
Aldrich, J. H. (1980). Before the convention: Strategies
and choices in presidential nomination campaigns.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Appleton, R. (2021, February 5). Nevada caucuses may





Atkeson, L. R., &Maestas, C. D. (2009).Meaningful partic‐
ipation and the evolution of the reformed presiden‐
tial nominating system. PS: Political Science and Poli‐
tics, 42(1), 59–64.
Bartels, L. M. (1988). Presidential primaries and the
dynamics of public choice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Berg‐Andersson, R. (2016). 2016 presidential primaries,
caucuses, and conventions. The Green Papers.
Retrieved from http://www.thegreenpapers.com/
P16/R
Busch, A. E. (1992). In defense of the “mixed” system:
The Goldwater campaign & the role of popular move‐
ments in the pre‐reform presidential nomination pro‐
cess. Polity, 24(4), 527–549.
Cohen, M., Karol, D., Noel, H., & Zaller, J. (2008). The
party decides: Presidential nominations before and
after reform. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Cohen, M. (2018). 2016: One party decided. In R. G. Boa‐
tright (Ed.), Routledge handbook of primary elections
(pp. 255–272). New York, NY: Routledge.
Cowan, G. (2016). Let the people rule: Theodore Roo‐
sevelt and the birth of the presidential primary. New
York, NY: W.W. Norton.
Culliford, E., & Reid, T. (2020, February 22). Slow results,
confusion and complaints at Nevada caucus sites.




DeSilver, D. (2016). Contested presidential conventions,
andwhy parties try to avoid them. Pew Research Cen‐
ter. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact‐tank/2016/02/04/contested‐presidential‐
conventions‐and‐why‐parties‐try‐to‐avoid‐them
Douglas, A., Richie, R., & Louthen, E. (2016). Simulat‐
ing instant runoff flips most Donald Trump primary
victories. FairVote. Retrieved from https://www.
fairvote.org/simulating_instant_runoff_flips_most_
donald_trump_primary_victories
Ecelbarger, G. (2008). The great comeback: How Abra‐
ham Lincoln beat the odds to win the 1860 Republi‐
can nomination. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
FairVote. (2016). The 2016 presidential election and elec‐
toral reform: How better polling tells us what Repub‐
lican voters really think (2nd ed.). Takoma Park, MD:
FairVote.
FairVote. (2020a). Contested conventions. FairVote.
Retrieved from https://www.fairvote.org/
contested_conventions
FairVote. (2020b). Timeline of ranked choice voting
in Maine. FairVote. Retrieved from https://www.
fairvote.org/maine_ballot_initiative
FairVote. (2020c). Vote tracker in presidential nomina‐




Ginsburg, A. (2019). It’s official. DNC approves plans of
two states to use ranked choice voting in candidate




Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 354–364 362
Ginsburg, A. (2020a). Almost a million votes were
“wasted” this month. Ranked choice voting can make




Ginsburg, A. (2020b, February 21). More than 70,000
Nevada caucus votes cast with ranked choice vot‐




Ginsburg, A. (2020c). RCV in Nevada Democratic
caucus early voting contributes to high turnout.
FairVote. Retrieved from https://www.fairvote.org/
rcv_in_nevada_democratic_caucus_early_voting_
contributes_to_high_turnout
Hunnicutt, T., & Brice, M. (2019, August 30). Demo‐
cratic National Committee opposes Iowa, Nevada





Kennedy, C., Blumenthal, M., Clement, S., Clinton, J. D.,
Durand, C., Franklin, C., . . . Wlezien, C. (2018). An
evaluation of the 2016 election polls in the United
States. Public Opinion Quarterly, 82(1), 1–33.
King, J. D. (2018). Party rules and equitable representa‐
tion in U.S. presidential nominating contests. Ameri‐
can Politics Research, 46(5), 811–833.
McCormick, J. (2021, January 29). Iowa Democrats,
Republicans gear up to protect 2024 caucuses.
The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://
www.wsj.com/articles/iowa‐democrats‐republicans‐
gear‐up‐to‐protect‐2024‐caucuses‐11611925201
McDonald, M. P. (2020). 2020 presidential nomination
contest turnout rates [Data set]. Retrieved from
http://www.electproject.org/2020p
McGovern–Fraser Commission. (n.d.). McGovern–
Fraser Commission Report. Ashland, OH: Teach‐
ing American History. Retrieved from https://
teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/
mcgovern‐fraser‐commission‐report
McVeigh, R. (2001). Power devaluation, the Ku Klux Klan,
and the Democratic National Convention of 1924.
Sociological Forum, 16(1), 1–30.
Norrander, B. (1996). Presidential nomination politics
in the post‐reform era. Political Research Quarterly,
49(4), 875–915.
Oberstaedt, M. (2020). What American political
parties can learn from Canada’s Conservatives.
FairVote. Retrieved from https://www.fairvote.org/
what_american_political_parties_can_learn_from_
canada_s_conservatives
Olsen, H. (2020, August 31). Let’s fix our flawed primary
system with ranked‐choice voting. The Washington
Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/2020/08/13/lets‐fix‐our‐flawed‐
primary‐system‐with‐ranked‐choice‐voting
Otis, D. (2020a). Early votes in Washington were more
likely to be “wasted.” FairVote. Retrieved from
https://www.fairvote.org/early_votes_in_
washington_were_more_likely_to_be_wasted
Otis, D. (2020b). Ranked choice voting in 2020 pres‐
idential primary elections. FairVote. Retrieved
from https://fairvote.app.box.com/s/nio79ymdmpi
qjpqen241fbs07akk5smx
Putnam, J. (2016). 2016 Republican delegate alloca‐
tion rules by state. Frontloading HQ. Retrieved from
http://www.frontloadinghq.com/p/2016‐
republican‐delegate‐allocation‐by.html
Putnam, J. (2019). How the 15% threshold for primary




Redlawsk, D. P., Tolbert, C. J., & Donovan, T. (2010).
Why Iowa? How caucuses and sequential elec‐
tions improve the presidential nominating process.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Richie, R. (2016). Without an instant runoff, Trump




Robert III, H. M., Honemann, D. H., & Balch, T. J. (2011).
Robert’s rules of order newly revised (11th ed.).
Philadelphia, PA: Da Capo Press.
Roberts, R. N., Hammond, S. J., & Sulfaro, V. A. (2004).
Presidential campaigns, slogans, issues, and plat‐
forms: The complete encyclopedia (1st ed.). Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC‐CLIO.
Scala, D. J. (2018). The fuzzy frontrunner: Donald Trump
and the role of ideology in presidential nomination
politics. In R. G. Boatright (Ed.), Routledge handbook
of primary elections (pp. 290–307). New York, NY:
Routledge.
Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). Identity cri‐
sis: The 2016 presidential campaign and the battle
for the meaning of America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Silver, N. (2016). Does Donald Trump have a ceiling?
FiveThirtyEight. Retrieved from https://fivethirty
eight.com/videos/does‐donald‐trump‐have‐a‐
ceiling
Steger, W. P. (2016). Conditional arbiters: The limits of
political party influence in presidential nominations.
PS: Political Science and Politics, 49(4), 709–715.
Steger, W. P. (2018). Citizen choice in presidential pri‐
maries. In R. G. Boatright (Ed.), Routledge handbook
of primary elections (pp. 273–289). New York, NY:
Routledge.
Super Tuesday results 2016. (2016, September 29).
The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.
nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/2016‐03‐01
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 354–364 363
Uhrmacher, K., Schaul, K., & Mellnik, T. (2016, March 9).
Republicans adjusted rules for their primaries after




Unite America Institute. (2020). Ranked choice voting:
The solution to the presidential primary predicament.
Unite America. Retrieved fromhttps://docsend.com/
view/jnu3d442irjgaagb
Whitney, G. (2004). Before modern conventions. Hauen‐
stein Center for Presidential Studies. Retrieved from
http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/ask_gleaves/77
About the Authors
Rob Richie has been FairVote’s Leader since co‐founding the organization in 1992 andwas named pres‐
ident and CEO in 2018. He has been involved in helping to develop, win, and implement ranked choice
voting, fair representation voting systems, theNational Popular Vote plan, and several voter access pro‐
posals. Richie is a frequent television, radio and print media source, and his writings have appeared
in the opinion pages of the The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal and
11 books.
Benjamin Oestericher is an Intern with the Executive Department at FairVote. He is on a gap year and
is a rising freshman at Georgetown University where he intends to study International Politics. Before
joining FairVote, he conducted political research, coordinated candidate communications, and man‐
aged direct persuasion and advocacy strategies with a variety of progressive political consulting firms
and campaigns fighting for structural reforms to America’s politics.
Deb Otis is a Senior Research Analyst in the Law and Policy Department at FairVote. She is a founding
member of Voter Choice Massachusetts, the campaign to win RCV statewide in Massachusetts, and
joined FairVote to continue her work supporting electoral reform at the national level. Deb is a gradu‐
ate of Boston University with degrees in Economics and Physics.
Jeremy Seitz‐Brown is Assistant to the President at FairVote, where he supports the President and CEO
in a variety ofways, includingwithwriting, research, boardmeetings, and donor relations. Jeremy grad‐
uated from Swarthmore College in 2018 with a double major in Political Science (honors) and Spanish.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 354–364 364
